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Michigan Law Review
Use of Record of Criminal Conviction in Subsequent
Civil Action Arising From the Same Facts
as the Prosecution
The overwhelming majority of courts considering the issue with-
out the aid of pertinent legislation' have held that a record of a
prior criminal conviction may not be used against a convicted person
in subsequent civil proceedings arising from the same facts as the
criminal prosecution but to which the state is not a party.2 It is
1. There are a number of statutes controlling the use which may be made of the
record of a criminal conviction in a subsequent civil proceeding. Some give it great
weight. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 412 (1958) ("between parties and privies thereto ...
[the record of conviction] is conclusive as to matters directly in issue.'). Some give
it no weight. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1.16 (Page 1953) (prohibiting use of a
record of prior conviction even as evidence in a civil action brought by a person in-
jured by a criminal act). Some provide that convictions on traffic charges are inadmis-
sible. See, e.g., MICH. CoMp. LAws § 257.731 (1948). There is a basis for distinguishing
convictions for violation of traffic ordinances from other convictions on the ground that
a traffic offender is often unwilling to contest the charges to the utmost of his ability,
since the expense and inconvenience of litigation frequently exceed the penalty for
conviction. Rule 63(20) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, in fact, provides for the
admission of -the record of a prior felony only.
2. The term "conviction" is used herein only in reference to the verdict of a judge
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admissible neither as evidence of the facts underlying it, nor as the
basis of an estoppel preventing the convicted party from relitigating
those issues which must have been decided against him in the
criminal trial for the judge or jury to have found him guilty.3 Conse-
quently, a man convicted of arson for burning his own property
may nevertheless succeed in collecting the proceeds of his fire in-
surance policy, unless the insurer can prove the origin of the
destruction unassisted by the record of conviction. 4 Similarly, one
found guilty of criminal assault may successfully defend a subse-
quent tort action brought by the complaining witness in the criminal
trial which led to the conviction if the plaintiff is unable to make
a convincing case without the use of the record of that conviction in
his civil suit."
A few courts rely upon the hearsay rule to exclude a record of
prior conviction even as evidence of the facts which must have been
found in the criminal trial.6 Technically, the record of a prior judg-
ment does fall within the usual definition of hearsay insofar as it is
used to demonstrate the findings of fact supporting it, for it is evi-
dence of assertions made outside the civil trial, offered to show the
truth of the matters alleged, and deriving its probative value
partially from the credibility and capacity of the absent asserter.7
However, the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule demonstrate
or a jury when the criminal defendant has pleaded innocent. The questions which
arise when one party seeks to use, in a later civil case, the record of a criminal conviction
where the other party pleaded guilty or nolo contendere in the former trial are outside
the scope of .this note. Likewise, the text contains no discussion of the problems inherent
in attempting to determine which issues raised in the criminal trial were necessarily
decided by the fact finder in reaching a verdict. For a brief treatment, see generally
von Moschzishen, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L. J. 299, 332 (1929). Furthermore, this note
does not deal with the situation in which the state or federal government which prose-
cuted the criminal litigation is also a party to a subsequent civil proceeding emanating
from the same facts, as for example where a defendant convicted of tax fraud is later
sued for the amount of unpaid taxes referable to his misconduct. Cases of this type
are discussed in Note, 64 MicH. L. REv. 317 (1965).
3. 2 BLAcK, JUDGMENTS § 529 (1891); FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 319 (lst ed. 1873); JoNES,
EvmENc:E § 589 (3d ed. 1924); McCoRMICK, EvmENc § 295 (1954); Developments in the
Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. Ray. 818, 878-80 (1952).
4. See McSweeney v. Utica Fire Ins. Co., 224 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1955) (dictum);
Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Coomer, 158 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Bobereski
v. Insurance Co. of the State of Pa., 105 Pa. Super. 585, 161 At. 412 (1932) (dictum);
Girard v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 Atl. 666 (1931).
5. See Krowka v. Colt Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co., 125 Conn. 705, 8 A.2d 5 (1939);
Nowak v. Orange, 349 Pa. 217, 36 A.2d 781 (1944).
6. Only a few cases expressly state that a record of prior conviction is hearsay evi-
dence. E.g., Manning v. Watson, 108 Cal. App. 2d 705, 239 P.2d 688 (1952). A number
of courts imply that such a record is hearsay when they receive it into evidence as an
admission against interest (an exception to the hearsay rule) if it is based on a guilty
plea. See Rednall v. Thompson, 108 Cal. App. 2d 662, 239 P.2d 693 (1952); Ando v.
Woodberry, 8 N.Y.2d 165, 230 N.Y.S.2d 74, 168 N.E.2d 520 (1960); cf. Burbank v.
McIntyre, 135 Cal. App. 482, 27 P.2d 400 (1933). A comment to Uniform Rule of Evi-
dence 63(20) also implies that a record of a prior conviction is hearsay.
7. See McCoRmicK, EvmEcNc § 225 (1954).
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that it is not an incontrovertible principle which must be followed
unswervingly s Its primary purpose is to safeguard a litigant's right
to challenge the accuracy and completeness of testimony introduced
against him by cross-examining the witness upon whose credibility
its worth depends.9 Since the testimony underlying a guilty verdict
in the criminal trial was subject to cross-examination during the
criminal proceeding, some courts have held that the record of that
verdict is sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible as evidence of the
underlying findings of fact.10
The remaining courts which hold records of prior conviction
inadmissible for evidentiary purposes rely upon the doctrine of
mutuality, as do all which refuse to use such records to estop con-
victed parties from relitigating issues which were necessarily decided
against them in the criminal trial. The mutuality principle, which is
premised upon the belief that the adversary system can be operated
equitably only if a litigant has the opportunity to challenge any
allegation as often as it is raised against him by an opponent with
whom he has not previously contested it," holds that a party is not
bound by a fact determined against him in previous litigation unless
the opponent seeking to bind him was also his adversary in the
previous trial.' 2 Strict adherence to this precept automatically pre-
8. See generally id. §§ 230-99.
9. Id. § 224, at 458. See generally id. §§ 223-29; 5 WIoMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d
ed. 1940).
10. E.g., North River Ins. Co. v. Militello, 104 Colo. 28, 88 P.2d 567 (1939); Wolff v.
Employers Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S.W.2d 640 (1940); Schindler v. Royal Ins.
Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932). Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(20) would permit
the use of the record of a prior felony conviction as evidence of the findings of fact
underlying it.
11. One of the earliest statements of the premises upon which the doctrine of mu-
tuality rests is found in the Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 State Tr. 355 (House of
Lords 1776): "it would be unjust to bind any person who could not be admitted to
make a defence or to examine witnesses, or to appeal from a judgment he might think
erroneous."
The mutuality rule appears to have taken its name from this reasoning: The adver-
sary system implies that A has a right to litigate an issue as -many times as it is raised
against him by a party with whom he has not already contested the point; this right will
always be protected if B cannot raise an estoppel unless he was privy to the prior adju-
dication; privity can always be assured if the alignment of parties in -the former trial
was such that, had the issue in question been decided in favor of A, A could now fairly
estop B from relitigating; therefore, "mutuality" of estoppel guarantees A's right to
litigate the issue against those who raise it against him for the first time.
12. See, e.g., New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 251(S.D.N.Y. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 117 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1941); Washington Nat'l
Ins. Co. v. Clement, 192 Ark. 371, 91 S.W.2d 265 (1936); North River Ins. Co. v.
Militello, 104 Colo. 28, 88 P.2d 567 (1939) (no estoppel, but record admitted as
evidence); Wolff v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S.W.2d (1940) (no estoppel,
but record admitted as evidence); Silva v. Silva, 297 Mass. 217, 7 N.E.2d 601 (1937);
Durham Bank & Trust Co. v. Pollard, 256 N.C. 77, 123 S.E.2d 104 (1961); Smith v. New
Dixie Lines Inc., 201 Va. 466, 111 S.E.2d 434 (1959); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Anderson,
200 Va. 385, 105 S.E.2d 869 (1958). Cf. Elder v. New York & Pa. Motor Express, Inc., 284
N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940); BLACK, JUDGMEN"S § 529 (1891); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTs
§ 428 (5th ed. 1925); McCoansiCK, EVIDENcE § 295 (1954); 39 VA. L. REv. 995, 996 (1953).
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cludes an individual's using the record of any prior conviction in a
later civil suit brought by or against the convicted person, for the
latter has previously litigated with the state, not with his present
opponent.
While the reasoning behind the mutuality rule may have some
appeal in the estoppel context, it has none, at least in theory, when
the question is merely the admissibility of the record of a prior
conviction as evidence. Unlike the use of a record of conviction as
the basis of an estoppel, the introduction of the record as evidence
does not foreclose the person against whom it is offered from deny-
ing the truth of its underlying findings of fact; he can still contest
them with evidence of his own. Nevertheless, a practical consider-
ation supports the exclusionary rule. Once a civil jury learns that a
party before it has been convicted of a crime arising from events
the occurrence of which he is attempting to deny, the jury is likely
to be so prejudiced that it will accept the evidence of conviction as
conclusive proof of the findings of fact supporting it.13 From a
realistic point of view, therefore, those courts which approve the
reasoning behind the mutuality rule would be inclined to prohibit
the introduction for any purpose of a record of criminal conviction
into subsequent litigation.
Some courts do not accept the foregoing views on the mutuality
doctrine or the rationale behind the views. The 1927 decision of the
Virginia Supreme Court in Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co.
v. Heller 4 was one of the first opinions holding that a record of a
criminal conviction could estop a party to a civil suit from re-
litigating certain issues necessarily decided against him in a prior
criminal trial, even though all parties to each trial were not the
same. The court ruled that his conviction for arson precluded the
owner from denying that he had burned his inventory when he sued
to collect the insurance proceeds. The California Supreme Court
reached a like result in Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co.15
However, there is a significant difference in the reasoning of the
two courts in departing from the traditional approach. The Virginia
tribunal acknowledged that, while the mutuality doctrine is gen-
"The rule of collateral estoppel .may be described as a compromise between the
interests of the litigant in pressing his claim and the interest of -the public in bringing
an end to one man's litigation. Under it one man may have his day in court, but only
one day, against another. But the rule does not go so far as to make the finding in one
man's case in a personal action a conclusion of ultimate truth. A law suit is not a
laboratory experiment for the discovery of physical laws of universal application but
a means of settling a dispute between litigants." Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight
Lines, 133 F.2d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 1943).
13. See Bobereski v. Insurance Co. of -the State of Pa., 105 Pa. Super. 585, 161 Atl.
412 (1932). See generally 50 YALE L. J. 499 (1941).
14. 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
15. 58 Cal. 2d 601, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439 (1962).
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erally viable, if a person convicted of a crime seeks thereafter to gain
from his criminal activities, rigid adherence to a general rule and
to some judicial expressions would be a reproach to the administra-
tion of justice.'0 In the light of this statement, Heller must be con-
sidered a narrow exception to the usual rule, explained by the court's
distaste for the result it might have had to reach if it had followed
the weight of authority.
The rationale in Teitelbaum was broader. Justice Traynor's
opinion did not mention the fact that a convicted person was the
plaintiff in the civil case brought to enforce a claim arising from
criminal conduct. The court went to the heart of the matter by deny-
ing that there was any reasonable basis for applying the mutuality
rule in any case, except insofar as it requires that the person against
whom an estoppel is asserted have been a party to the prior action. 7
This single restriction was felt to be all that is necessary to guarantee
a party due process of law, and to more than due process he was
apparently not thought entitled.
That Teitelbaum has not been limited to its facts is apparent
from Newman v. Larsen,' in which a California intermediate ap-
pellate court relied upon Justice Traynor's opinion in holding that
a defendant previously convicted of criminal assault was bound by
the allegations in the criminal complaint necessarily found to have
been true by the criminal jury. The defendant, therefore, was not
permitted to deny that he had assaulted the plaintiff, who had been
the prosecuting witness in the former trial. The court apparently
saw no significance in the fact that the effect of the estoppel in New-
man was not merely to deny the convicted party the fruits of his
crime, but rather to set the stage for the assessment of personal-
injury damages against him.
Hurtt v. Stirone9 resembles Teitelbaum and Heller as well as
Newman in its result. In Hurtt the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that a trustee in bankruptcy, suing to recover money which
the defendant had allegedly extorted from the bankrupt, could
introduce the record of the defendant's conviction of the federal
offense of obstructing interstate commerce by means of extortion 20
to estop him from denying the wrongful taking, where the bankrupt
had been the complaining witness in the federal case. In Hurtt the
defendant had already reaped the proceeds of the crime, and the
plaintiff was simply trying to regain money of which the bankrupt
16. 149 Va. 82, 111, 140 S.E. 314, 323 (1927).
17. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 606, 25 Cal. Rptr.
559, 561, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962).
18. 225 Cal. App. 2d 22, 36 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1964).
19. 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965).
20. The federal offense arose under the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (1964). See generally Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
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had been deprived. Hence, the case is similar to Newman in that
estoppel was used as an offensive weapon by a civil plaintiff, but also
analogous to Teitelbaum and Heller in that only the profit of the
crime was at stake.
One can hardly object to the outcome in either Heller or Teitel-
baum. Unjust enrichment was avoided, and the public welfare
advanced, by preventing a criminal from profiting from his illegal
conduct. Furthermore, by sanctioning the use of a record of convic-
tion to bar recovery in a subsequent civil action, these decisions are
likely to reduce the number of suits brought by criminals to enforce
"rights" purportedly arising from their unlawful activity. Newman
and Hurtt, however, raise serious questions, for whereas Heller and
Teitelbaum foreclosed the plaintiffs' recovery and maintained the
status quo, Newman and Hurtt made the convicted defendants
judgment debtors. They put the fruits of a state's criminal enforce-
ment process at the disposal of potential civil plaintiffs who might
otherwise be reluctant to sue. Persons suffering minor injuries as the
result of criminal violence who would be willing to bear the medical
expense themselves will be advised that a lawsuit is an easy and
economical alternative if the defendant has been successfully pros-
ecuted. Insurance companies will find it profitable to litigate more
subrogation claims arising from criminal acts. Thus, in a jurisdiction
following Hurtt or Newman there could be an increase in the
number of suits brought to issue, at least on the question of damages,
even if there were no doubt of a convicted person's civil liability.21
Assuming that the courts should be prepared to absorb any
added workload, the question remains whether, in extending de
facto the criminal process to include incontestable civil liability,
Hurtt and Newman have not established an inflexible rule detri-
mental to social objectives in the post-conviction rehabilitation of
offenders. The criminal process is aimed in part at preventing the
guilty from profiting from their crimes, and legislation often permits
a criminal court to condition probation upon a convicted defendant's
making "restitution" to his victim. 22 There is a significant difference,
21. A plaintiff should be more willing to go to trial if the only issue is damages. Since
he cannot lose on the liability issue he should be less inclined to accept a settlement
than if there were a chance that the defendant would be found not liable and he would
collect nothing. It might also be expected that, if the litigation is limited to the damage
issue, the relative -merits of the parties' claims will not come before the jury and that,
therefore, compromise verdicts are precluded.
22. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964); MicH. CoMP. LAws § 771.3 (1948); Wis. STAT.
§ 57.01(1) (1963). The general role of the judiciary in the probation process is discussed
in Notes, 59 CoLUM. L. Rxv. 311 (1959); 39 COLum. L. REv. 1185, 1197 (1939). See PROssER,
TORTs § 2, at 7 (1964); PERKINS, CRImINAL LAw 21, (1957). The latter author states that
the often-heard phrase "crimes against the person" is but a shorthand way of describing
an offense against the state arising from the harm to the citizen. Ibid. See also People
v. Gilliam, 141 Cal. App. 2d 749, 297 P.2d 468 (1956), noting that a person accused of a
Notes
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however, between the method of fulfilling a probation order and that
of executing a civil judgment. The criminal court can control the
satisfaction of the guilty party's liability in order to reconcile his re-
sponsibility with rehabilitation policies. On the facts of Hurtt, for ex-
ample, if the convicted defendant no longer retained the money he
had extorted, he would not be forced to give up the few assets he
might own to recompense his victim. The court has broad discretion
in determining the amount due and in fixing the conditions of pay-
ment.23 For example, it could order periodic contributions begin-
ning only after the defendant has secured a steady job and is able to
provide for his family's comfort. If a subsequent change in condi-
tions warranted lesser or greater installments, the terms of probation
could be modified accordingly or even canceled entirely. In short,
the sentencing court would retain enough control over the execution
of its decree to adjust the demands upon the probationer to his
circumstances. A civil judgment obtained with the aid of the record
of previous conviction, however, need not be based upon a deter-
mination which takes account of the difficulties facing the defendant
as he tries to become reassimilated into society. Furthermore, once
the judgment is docketed, it can be executed by attachment or
garnishment as quickly as possible. Even though some of his property
may be exempt from execution and a portion of his earnings
protected against garnishment, the very fact that an unalterable obli-
gation hangs over him cannot fail to have an adverse psychological
impact upon the defendant, especially if he has recently been re-
leased from prison.24 With the knowledge that any earnings not
needed for subsistence will go to his judgment creditor, a person who
has recently demonstrated strains of moral or social instability is
unlikely to be motivated to strive for economic independence. If
this is so, not only will the judgment remain unsatisfied, but the
defendant may continue to be a burden on society.
Newman presents the same problem of execution control and
raises an additional difficulty as well. While the civil plaintiff in
Hurtt sought to recover only what the defendant had wrongfully
gained, his counterpart in the California case demanded compensa-
tion for personal injuries (including, presumably, an amount for
"crime against property" is really prosecuted in the interest of the state and not in that
of the individual whose property was involved.
French criminal law does permit the interests of both the public and the victim of
criminal activity to be considered simultaneously. See the French Code of Criminal
Procedure, as amended January 1963, at arts. 2, 3, 871, 872, 885, in 7 THE AMERICAN
SERIEs OF FORxIGN PENAL CODES (1960), allowing the victim to intervene in the criminal
prosecution and litigate his claim for damages.
28. See authorities cited note 22 supra.
24. The debtor exemption laws of twenty-two representative jurisdictions are ana-
lyzed (and criticized) in Joslin, Debtor's Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34
IND. L.J. 355 (1959).
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pain and suffering), measured not by what the defendant had gained
but rather by the strength of the impression of plaintiff's discom-
fort left with the jury. Any justification for the practical extension
of the criminal process in Hurtt found in the public policy against
allowing a criminal to profit from his crime is, therefore, absent in
Newman. Certainly public policy favors an injured person's re-
ceiving compensation from the one who harmed him; yet it is far
from clear that the criminal process is intended to foster this social
goal.25 Indeed, at least one court has construed state probation
legislation as precluding a criminal judge from conditioning pro-
bation upon the defendant's restoring more than the value of what he
had actually received from his victim. 26 Recalling that the criminal
process exists to punish the offender and to discourage him from
future violations of the law, one might suggest that, insofar as it
promotes these goals, a civil suit for compensation is an ideal com-
plement to a criminal trial. However, the sentence imposed by the
criminal court should be entirely sufficient to punish and deter. If
it has not been in some cases, its potential deficiency in similar
instances in the future could better be avoided by rethinking the
procedures surrounding the determination and execution of the
sentence itself rather than by imposing, in effect, conclusive civil
liability upon all convicted lawbreakers.
While it would be difficult to maintain that the results in either
Hurtt or Newman are unfair from the convicted party's point of
view, the problems each case raises suggest that the results may be
socially unwise. Even if it is thought desirable to relate compensation
of the victim to the criminal process, any attempt to do so should
be left to the legislature, which can best recognize and define con-
flicting policies and take precautions to ensure that some policies
will not be given effect at too great an expense to others.
25. It should be noted that when a defendant is ordered to "make restitution" to his
victim under the legislation discussed in the text this obligation is imposed as a con-
dition of probation, i.e., in lieu of imprisonment. The rules enunciated in Hurtt and
Newman, on the other hand, may be invoked against the convict who has spent a sig-
nificant period in prison.
26. People v. Prell, 299 II. App. 130, 19 N.E.2d 637 (1939). But see People v. Good,
287 Mich. 110, 282 N.W. 920 (1938).
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